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Summary / Abstract

Background

Undeployed charitable assets in donor-advised funds
(DAFs) reached $121.4 billion in 2018—including
$33.9 billion at Community Foundations. Most of these
undeployed funds are invested in conventional financial
instruments. However, DAFs present a unique opportunity to promote impact investing into the local community, including Community Development Financial
Institutions (CDFIs) that serve their local communities.
In addition to having already expressed a clear interest
in using funds for social purposes, DAF donors could
potentially realize a double-bottom-line benefit by placing undeployed funds in impact investments rather than
traditional stocks or bonds. Community impact investing should be an appealing option for DAF donors at
Community Foundations. The donor has already relinquished any possibility of personal benefit from the funds
in their DAF, and should therefore be interested exclusively in maximizing the social impact they can generate
with their funds. Lending the money to a social interest
project or organization for a few years while the donor
decides where to grant the funds seems like a rational
strategy to achieve greater impact. A substantial body of
evidence from the field of behavioral economics suggests
that most people do not, however, make rational decisions
about their investments or finances. Instead, a variety of
cognitive biases tend to drive their decisions, often resulting in sub-optimal financial outcomes.
In this study, DAF donors were invited to complete a
survey by the local community foundation that held their
investment. In the survey, the donors were asked to imagine that they had just contributed a sum of money to their
donor-advised fund. The survey then asked the donors
to determine how they wanted to invest their funds
before they were granted out to charitable organizations.
Donors were given four options, allocating between them
a percentage of their funds. Donors could then select the
desired term and interest rate for their investment in the
local community impact fund. The results suggest that
Community Foundations can exert considerable influence over donor allocations to community impact investing funds simply by changing how they frame the request.
In particular, if Foundations are willing to recommend a
default allocation to community impact investments—
even while allowing the donor full choice over the final
allocation that is actually implemented—they will see
substantially more funds going to this use.

The National Philanthropic Trust estimates that
undeployed charitable assets in donor-advised funds
(DAFs) reached $121.4 billion in 2018—including $33.9 billion at Community Foundations.1 It is
believed that most of these undeployed funds are
invested in conventional financial instruments. But
DAFs present a unique opportunity to promote impact
investing. In addition to having already expressed a
clear interest in using funds for social purposes, DAF
donors could potentially realize a double-bottom-line
benefit by placing undeployed funds in impact investments rather than traditional stocks or bonds. With
DAF annual payout rates sitting at 20 percent, a dollar
in a DAF has an expected life of 5 years during which
it could be invested for community good before being
donated to a charitable organization. Yet only a small
fraction of DAF donors have made any impact investments despite significant efforts on the part of many
DAF sponsors to offer impact investing opportunities.
Donor-advised fund sponsors, including community
foundations, have also expressed concerns over the
time and expense that it requires to educate and advise
DAF donors about impact investing.2
On its face, impact investing should be an appealing option for DAF donors. The donor has already
relinquished any possibility of personal benefit
from the funds in their DAF, and should therefore
be interested exclusively in maximizing the social
impact they can generate with their funds. Lending
the money to a local project or intermediary, such
as a Community Development Financial Institution
(CDFI), for a few years while the donor decides
where to grant the funds seems to us like a rational
strategy to achieve greater impact. As one donor put
it to us, “What really matters to me is that our funds
actually help make things better in our community.”
Another donor agreed, saying “I feel strongly that
funds intended to be given away should do good
while sitting in an advised fund before they are given
away. [Funds] should be invested 100% for impact.”
Furthermore, depending on the interests of the donor,
investing undeployed funds on the stock market
might actually run counter to their impact goals. As
another donor expressed to us, “I don’t want to be
donating to, say, public health and environmental
causes while investing in Philip Morris and Exxon.”
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To be sure, there are arguments to be made against
impact investing. Some DAF donors feel that there
exists an “obligation to the [eventual grant] recipients
to keep up with market performance at the lowest risk,”
as one put it. In a similar vein, another donor argued,
“One of my reasons for having a donor advised fund is
to put the money into professionally managed accounts
that would likely yield a higher return than I could on
my own, thereby increasing my ability to impact the
community.” Other donors might be skeptical about
whether an impact investment will generate the promised investment. Or, they might have a philosophical
opposition to activities to be funded by the investment
(“I have found impact investing to be associated with
certain left-wing ideologies,” declared one presumably
conservative donor). Possibly, the majority of DAF
holders have made a careful, informed decision not
to place funds in impact investments, based on one or
more of these lines of argument.
On the other hand, it is also possible that many
donors simply have not fully thought through their
choices, and are even underinvesting in impact investments relative to what they might choose upon more
thorough reflection. Consider these statements that we
heard from donors when asking them about how they
would like to allocate their DAF funds:
• “I don’t have a desire to control the investment
strategy. (In fact, the opposite: I don’t want to
have to think about it.)”
• “I’m not knowledgeable enough to make an
informed decision and I haven’t thought about
what my investment objectives should be.”
A substantial body of evidence from the field of
behavioral economics suggests that most people
do not, in fact, make rational decisions about their
investments or finances.3 Instead, a variety of cognitive biases tend to drive their decisions,4 including the
inertial effects we see in our study.5 These cognitive
biases can result in sub-optimal financial outcomes
relative to people’s expressed preferences. Bhamra
and Uppal (2019) find that investors tend to suffer
from “familiarity biases,” investing in a few assets
with which they are more familiar, with the result that
they hold under-diversified portfolios.6 Beshears et al.
(2007) find that simply changing the default option for
worker participation in their retirement program (to
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automatic enrollment where the worker can opt out)
dramatically changes participation rates.7 Even investment professionals suffer from cognitive biases. For
example, Cen et al. (2019) find that financial analysts
are impacted by anchoring biases (a sort of cognitive
over-dependence on an initial piece of information) in
assessing the future profitability of firms.8
There is also a body of work in the philanthropic
space that shows how behavioral nudges and cognitive strategies influence charitable giving. Kamdar et
al. (2015) find that the way charitable organizations
frame their requests can have a substantial impact on
giving.9 These “nudges” can vary based on the goals
of the charitable organization, and not all methods
are likely to work in all circumstances.10 Regardless,
charitable giving is an economic activity, and there is
every reason to believe that DAF donors are subject
to the same cognitive biases as other economic decision makers.11 Up to this point, however, very little
research has been done on this topic. As a result, DAF
sponsors are currently operating without an understanding of how behavioral finance may influence the
potential demand for impact investing and to effectively market impact investing opportunities.

Study Design
We designed a simple experiment to see whether
DAF donors’ choices of how to invest undeployed
funds can be influenced by behavioral “nudges.”12 For
the purpose of this study, we define a “nudge” as a
change in how donor choices are presented, with the
intention of increasing the percentage of undeployed
funds that donors designate for community impact
investments. Importantly, these nudges do not restrict
choice for the donors (they can choose any allocation
of funds to community impact investments, including
zero), nor do they change the underlying incentives
to invest (there are no special rewards provided for
donors allocating funds for impact investing).
The experiment worked as follows: DAF donors were
invited to complete a survey by the local Community
Foundation that held their investment. In the survey,
the donors were asked to imagine that they had just
contributed a sum of money to their donor-advised
fund. The survey then asked the donors to determine
how they wanted to invest their funds before they were
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granted out to charitable organizations. Donors could
select among four options, allocating a percentage of
their funds between the following options:
• A conventional, actively managed portfolio with
broad exposure to global equity and fixed-income
markets
• A mix of low-cost, passively managed stock and
bond index funds
• A “socially responsible” portfolio invested in a
mix of stock and bond funds that utilize environmental, social and governance factors in the
security selection process, and/or actively engage
with companies to promote social responsibility
among companies in which the fund invests.
• A “Local Community Impact Fund” described to
donors as a fund investing “in a range of nonprofit and social purpose organizations that serve
the community where you live.”
Donors could then select the desired term and interest rate for their investment in the local community
impact fund.
Without their knowledge, donors responding to the
survey were randomly selected to be placed into one
of four different groups. Each group received a slightly
different presentation of the Local Community Impact
Fund investing option:
• The baseline group received the following additional explanation about the Local Community
Impact Fund: “These investments may help to
grow businesses in low-income communities,
develop health care centers and grocery stores in
areas that lack them, build affordable housing,
or help low-income families to build or repair a
home, buy a car to get to work, or pay for education. This fund is intended to return capital over
time with only modest financial gain.”
• The second group received a more emotional
appeal utilizing stories about recipients of
investments made by the Local Community
Impact Fund—for example, about a single
mother working as a home health care aide who
would benefit from the construction of new
affordable housing that she could rent. We will
refer to this framing of investment choices as
the “storytelling approach.”

• The third group received the same description of
the options as the baseline group. However, the
survey had a set of numbers already entered in the
table where respondents chose how to allocate their
investments. Specifically, 40 percent of investments were selected to go to the Local Community
Impact Fund, and 20 percent to each of the other
options. Respondents were able to edit percentages to whatever allocation they preferred. The
survey text above the table read, “We have recommended an allocation for your consideration that
we believe balances the need for local investment
by the foundation and its donors with the need to
generate sufficient returns to maintain future grant
distributions over one’s lifetime, but you may edit
the percentages as you wish.” This option could
thus be described as anchoring the respondent to
the initial value of 40 percent assigned to the Local
Community Impact Fund—and as putting the
weight of a recommendation from their local community foundation behind that initial value. We
will refer to this framing of investment choices as
the “recommended allocation” approach.
• Finally, the fourth group received the same
description of the options as the baseline group,
with one piece of additional information about
the Local Community Impact Fund: “Community
impact investing is a growing trend in the United
States and increasingly, many high-net-worth
individuals, family offices, and leading foundations are dedicating a significant portion of their
assets to place-based community investing.” We
will refer to this framing of investment choices as
the “norming” approach (sharing information to
establish impact investing as a social norm).
Two community foundations—the Seattle
Community Foundation and the Grand Rapids
(Michigan) Community Foundation—agreed to
participate in the study and sent a neutrally-worded
invitation to the survey to their donors during the
fall of 2019. We received 195 total survey responses,
141 from Seattle and 54 from Grand Rapids.
Respondents were roughly evenly distributed across
the 4 different versions of the survey—49 for the
baseline approach, 43 for the storytelling approach,
54 for the recommended allocation approach, and
49 for the norming approach.
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A major limitation of the study is that survey respondents were being asked hypothetical questions about
an investment allocation—not to actually choose an
investment allocation of real dollars.

Study Results
On average, respondents in the baseline survey group
chose to allocate 18.5 percent of their investments to
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund. This
result is interesting in and of itself, as it suggests a level
of interest in community impact investing that is greater
than what has been achieved to date.
We observe powerful impacts on donor allocations to
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund for the
“recommended allocation” approach. Simply by making
a suggestion to respondents—a suggestion that respondents could readily opt out of, and with nothing more
than a mildly-worded recommendation to back it up, this
approach generated a 59 percent increase in the funds
allocated to the Local Community Impact Investment
Fund, compared to the baseline. The result was highly statistically significant (t = 2.86, p <.01 for a two-tailed test).
We also observe a modest bump in allocations to
the Local Community Impact Investment Fund for
the other two “nudges”—the storytelling approach
and the norming approach—but in these cases, the
results are not statistically significant.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY IMPACT INVESTMENT ALLOCATION DECISIONS BY SURVEY GROUP
Survey Group

Mean allocation
to Community
Impact Fund

T score for
comparison
to baseline
group

P value for
comparison to
baseline group
(2-tailed)

Baseline

18.5%

N/A

N/A

Storytelling
approach

19.9%

0.29

0.77

Recommended
allocation
approach

29.4%

2.86

0.005

Norming
approach

19.8%

0.26

0.79
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We find that donor demographics are significant predictors of the amounts they will allocate to
impact investing. Donors who are female, younger,
and who have smaller amounts in their DAFs all
tend to allocate larger amounts to impact investing,
as seen in Table 2.
TABLE 2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
Demographic
comparison

Mean allocation to
Community Impact
Fund

T score for P value for
comparison comparison
(2-tailed)

Men vs. women

16.9% for men;
29.1% for women

3.25

0.001

Donors 65 and
older vs. donors
younger than 65

17.2% for seniors;
27.0% for donors
under 65

2.70

0.008

Donors with under 14.9% for large
$500,000 in DAF
donors; 24.8% for
vs. donors with
small donors
$500,000 or more

2.68

0.008

To control for possible effects of demographic differences between survey groups, we run an OLS regression
to compare the baseline and recommended allocation
approaches, including control variables for the gender, age, and DAF holdings of the respondents. Due to
small sample sizes we reduce the age and DAF holdings variables to dichotomous variables (donor is under
65 or 65 or older; donor has less than $500,000 in the
DAF or over $500,000). We find that all variables save
gender continue to be statistically significant, and the
magnitude of the effect of the recommended allocation
approach remains the same after controlling for these
donor characteristics. Regression output is presented in
Table 3—“Anchoring” refers to whether the respondent
received the “Recommended Allocation” language.
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TABLE 3. REGRESSION OUTPUT

Variables:
• Dependent variable is the
percentage of DAF funds allocated to a Local Community
Impact Investment Fund
• Anchoring: = 1 if respondent
received recommendation for
community impact investment
allocation; = 0 if respondent
was in baseline group
• Senior: = 1 if respondent was
65 or older, 0 otherwise
• Genderflag: = 1 if respondent
was male, 0 if female
• Fund500k: = 1 if respondent’s
DAF had $500,000 or more in
assets, 0 otherwise

Conclusion
The results suggest that Community Foundations can
exert considerable influence over donor allocations to
community impact investing funds. In particular, if the
Foundations are willing to simply recommend a default
allocation to community impact investments—even
while allowing the donor full choice over the final
allocation that is actually implemented—they will see
substantially more funds going to this use.
We anticipate that investment advisors at DAF sponsor organizations might resist such an approach, with
two particular sources of reluctance. First, the investment advisors might argue that principles of good
financial stewardship require that DAF funds should be
invested for maximum financial return, regardless of
impact. We would argue in response that these investment advisors themselves might be suffering from
what behavioral economists would call a “status quo”
cognitive bias—in the investment world, most funds
are typically invested in conventional stock and bond
funds, with an eye only to financial risk and return. But
just because funds for other goals (such as retirement)
are managed in this way, should the same thinking
really apply to funds for which the donor has already
explicitly prioritized their social impact?
Second, the investment advisors might object to
the use of behavioral “nudges” to influence donor
behavior, either claiming that “donors know best”
or that it would be unseemly for a DAF sponsor to

attempt to influence their choices. This general class
of objection is frequently encountered in behavioral
economics and is addressed by Thaler and Sunstein
(2003).13 First, the assumption that DAF holders
are making rational, informed decisions about their
investments that best meet the goals they have set
for their funds and need no help to make better
decisions is questionable at best, given the behavioral finance literature. Second, a decision not to
make any recommendation on how to invest undeployed DAF funds still represents an active decision
on the part of the DAF sponsor, with known consequences for how funds will be invested. It is therefore incumbent upon the DAF sponsor to reflect
carefully on what it truly believes is the socially
optimal allocation of funds. Finally, it is important
to recognize that strategies such as recommending
an allocation of funds for impact investing do not in
any way coerce the donor into a decision. The donor
is still free to decide how to allocate their funds—the
difference is only in what the default option looks
like. Again, given the fact that DAF funds have been
explicitly designated for social impact, it is hard to
reconcile such a goal with a default investment allocation to conventional stocks and bonds.
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